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TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS 
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM. By Mark A. 
Graber.1 Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 
1991. Pp. xi, 336. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $15.00. 
Norman L. Rosenberg2 
Taking no prisoners, this aggressively revisionist history imme-
diately targets Harry Kalven, Jr.J "Contemporary libertarian argu-
ments," Transforming Free Speech begins, "are neither traditional 
nor worthy." Portrayed as the primary influence on contemporary 
First Amendment discourse, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., receives sus-
tained censure, especially for repudiating the "conservative liberta-
rianism" of late nineteenth-century jurists such as Thomas Cooley, 
Christopher Tiedeman and John W. Burgess. 
Conservative libertarians, according to Mark Graber, created a 
forward-looking, comprehensive view of speech issues. They es-
poused defamation rules, for example, that anticipated New York 
Times v. Sullivan. They opposed overseas expansion in the 1890s, 
foreseeing that divisions over foreign policy could fuel calls for cur-
tailing speech rights at home. More important for his primary 
theme, Graber argues that conservative libertarians linked speech 
and economic issues in a coherent conception of individually based, 
judicially protected rights. They recognized "a sphere of private 
mental conduct that was as inviolate as their cherished sphere of 
private commercial conduct." 
During and after World War I, however, scholars and jurists 
such as Chafee, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis 
helped to "transform" conservative libertarianism into the "civil 
libertarian" approach to speech issues. Criticizing functionalist his-
tories, which see Chafee's generation simply responding to wartime 
censorship and gaps in existing free-speech doctrine, Graber denies 
that civil libertarianism represented "a necessary response" to re-
pression. The older libertarianism, in fact, actually would have "af-
forded better protection" than the civil libertarianism invented 
during World War I and the 1920s. For example, in contrast to 
Chafee, who accepted the legitimacy of some controls, John W. 
Burgess (the only prominent conservative libertarian alive in 1917-
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18) denounced all the speech regulations established by Congress 
and Woodrow Wilson's administration as unconstitutional. 
Why did civil libertarians go wrong? Invoking political theo-
rist Quentin Skinner and legal scholar James Boyd White, Graber 
concentrates upon the "intellectual environment," the "modes of 
rhetorical justification" that shaped and constrained civil libertari-
anism. This approach leads him to the general ideology of progres-
sivism and the specific tenets of sociological jurisprudence. 
Adapting political progressivism to law, scholars such as Chafee 
and Roscoe Pound stressed the social dimensions of legal decision-
making. In place of the individualistic, natural rights, anti-statist 
tilt of conservative libertarianism, civil libertarians emphasized the 
social context of all rights claims and the reformist potential of 
state-sponsored social legislation. This approach ultimately trans-
formed free-speech doctrines. 
In speech cases, civil libertarians' commitment to the intellec-
tual assumptions of sociological jurisprudence produced a "central 
dilemma." While insisting that democratic societies protect dissent-
ing expression in order to encourage diversity and invigorate public 
dialogue, they also considered a society "democratic only if elected 
representatives determined what social interests would be protected 
and promoted." "For reasons unrelated to expression rights, 
though clearly related to property rights," progressives jettisoned 
the conservative-libertarian conviction that courts jealously guard 
all individual liberties against socio-economic legislation. Inverting 
Cooley's calculus, progressives accorded freedom of speech "no 
higher constitutional status than freedom of contract." Their anti-
Lochner convictions, in this sense, worked against strong judicial 
protection for freedom of speech. 
From this perspective, the First Amendment writings of both 
Holmes and Brandeis are found wanting. In a judgment that, ironi-
cally, parallels Harry Kalven's, Graber concludes that Holmes was 
never really interested in the problem of protecting speech.4 
Although Brandeis "sharpened" Holmes's musings about protected 
expression, he contributed no comprehensive free-speech theory of 
his own. Those Brandeis-inspired opinions of the 1920s and early 
1930s that did uphold speech claims simply adopted an expedient 
pragmatism. "As long as conservative justices struck down laws 
that abridged the freedom of contract, liberal jurists unashamedly 
used those precedents to strike laws that abridged the freedom of 
speech."s 
4. See, e.g., id. at 133-36. 
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Zechariah Chafee's voluminous writings bequeathed the most 
flawed legacy. By emphasizing social rather than individual inter-
ests and by limiting the judiciary's protective role, Chafee ignored 
conservative libertarianism's crucial insight: that doctrines about 
protected speech must confront economic relationships within pub-
lic life. Steadfastly rejecting any general judicial power to strike 
down "reasonable" legislation in the name of individual liberties, 
Chafee justified protection of speech on instrumentalist grounds 
that squared with his anti-Lochnerism. Judicial scrutiny of free-
speech claims, according to Chafee, should primarily look toward 
the broader process by which popular opinion took shape rather 
than the specific rights of individual speakers. A process-oriented 
approach to speech issues would, he hoped, encourage wise social 
and economic legislation-which the judiciary should not casually 
strike down-that rested upon fully informed public discussion. 
Unfortunately, this circuitous strategy for legitimating "some 
form of judicial activism" on First Amendment issues "implicitly 
pretend[ ed] that the distribution of economic resources did not af-
fect the system of freedom of expression." Focused on governmen-
tal restraints, Chafee ignored broader economies of power and 
knowledge. Any remedies for "private restraints on fair discussion" 
must come from "an aroused public opinion and the enterprise of 
individuals and the community, with the possibility of affirmative 
governmental action in the background," he wrote in 1941. 
Graber thus scolds Chafee for creating a free-speech tradition 
that remained "structurally insensitive" to the economic concentra-
tion that was already stifling dissenting speech. Later theorists such 
as Thomas I. Emerson and Vincent Blasi, though recognizing that 
"material inequalities threaten the democratic process," continued 
"to place the relationship between private property and free speech 
at the periphery" of First Amendment discussions. With main-
stream scholarship still focused on the venerable free-speech versus 
illegal conduct debate-largely an issue of the past, according to 
Graber's analysis-"virtually all recent" discussions either ignore, 
slight, or fail to "resolve" the relationship between speech and 
property. 
Intending to build upon Michael Walzer's work on political 
and property rights, Graber promises a subsequent study that will 
develop a "political libertarian approach to free-speech problems." 
"old Court's'' work in the area of protected speech offered in John Braeman, Before the Civil 
Rights Revolution: The Old Coun and Individual Rights (Greenwood Press, 1988) and Vin-
cent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in 
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Briefly outlining such a project, he first suggests that "only speech 
uttered for the purpose of causing criminal conduct is beyond the 
pale of the First Amendment." If this principle were applied retro-
actively to Supreme Court cases, only Benjamin Gitlow would have 
overstepped the protected sphere for dissenting speech. 6 
On problems of speech and property, Graber suggests that the 
threshold question should be "When is money speech? rather than 
Is money speech? Individuals have the constitutional right to con-
vert their material resources into political expression [only] as long 
as the average member of the community can afford to invest simi-
larly in politics." Apparently offered as an updating of the individ-
ualistic approach of Cooley's day, political libertarianism would 
deny special speech rights to corporations and labor unions; uphold 
the type of regulations on corporate contributions struck down in 
Bellotti ;7 accept the campaign spending limits invalidated in Buck-
ley v. Valeo;s and, more generally, authorize legislation aimed at 
preventing wealthy persons from "convert[ing] material advantages 
into political expression." 
Transforming Free Speech is an ambitious, valuable and pro-
vocative book. It effectively argues that contemporary scholarship 
might draw from more than a single "worthy tradition"; that histo-
ries of free expression cannot "stand apart from American political 
and intellectual developments"; and that any free-speech theory-
including Graber's own-is historically contingent, "a product of 
its times." But as an attempt tore-imagine the past as a prologue to 
clearing theoretical space for the present, the book invites dissent on 
a variety of specific issues. 
Although skeptical of various parts of Transforming Free 
Speech, including the claim that Chafee's framework still confines 
First Amendment discussions, I will note only two issues here: the 
book's narrow reading of "intellectual" history during the crucial 
"transformation" period, and a similarly constricted approach to 
what might be called the "cultural politics of speech." In terms of 
both these issues, the book's call for considering First Amendment 
issues against a broad historical backdrop seems only partially 
realized. 
First, when exploring conservative and civil libertarian 
thought, Transforming Free Speech follows a rather narrow path. 
At points it pursues "the not-so-great-person" mode of legal his-
tory: Had only previous theorist X solved earlier dilemma Y more 
6. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
7. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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effectively, we would have been spared today's doctrinal crisis Z. 
Thus, Zechariah Chafee "obscured earlier libertarian arguments," 
imagined a "mythical tradition" for his own views, and "stunted the 
development" of "more protective" principles. This formulation 
places too much weight upon legal thought in general and individ-
ual thinkers in particular; in addition, it appears to fly in the face of 
the book's own, better-conceived arguments about the historical 
contingency of legal discourse. 
Yet even Transforming Free Speech's best moments, some his-
torians may find, too often fall back upon a reductionist, binary 
framework-conservative vs. civil libertarianism-that limits its 
view of free-speech debates. Fifty years separated Thomas Cooley's 
and Zechariah Chafee's initial writings on free expression, and (per-
haps inevitably) Transforming Free Speech cannot adequately repre-
sent a half-century's intellectual history. To link the demise of 
Cooley's libertarianism to the rise of progressivism and sociological 
jurisprudence-and then to characterize the resultant civil libertari-
anism as a step backward in free-speech theory-simply ignores too 
much about these complex discourses and, more importantly, about 
other historical discussions of speech issues. 
Articulated in its own historically contingent texts, conserva-
tive libertarianism, for instance, may have actually been "trans-
formed" prior to the emergence of sociological jurisprudence. 
Thomas Cooley's earliest ideas about libel law, which always repre-
sented a minority position, underwent important transformations 
during the 1880s.9 And well before Chafee (or other civil libertari-
ans) had begun to write, the dominant legal approach to libel and 
many other speech issues had, arguably, already assumed the "neo-
Blackstonian" form that Justice Holmes endorsed in Patterson v. 
Colorado.w The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in 
other words, may have seen transformations within as well as of 
conservative libertarianism that do not fit into a binary approach. 
Similarly, attempts to locate the historical contexts of specific 
legal texts may require more precise mapping than Graber's frame-
work allows. For example, the works of John W. Burgess, cited as 
examples of the continuing vitality of conservative libertarianism 
during World War I, might also be read in light of Burgess's rabid 
pro-German sympathies. His final books, contemporaries in the 
historical profession argued, seemed more pro-German-and anti-
9. See, e.g., Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of 
the Law of Libel 178-206 (U. of N.C. Press, 1986). 
10. 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See also the general discussion in Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The 
Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Press in America 1-7 (U. of Cal. Press, 
1991). 
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Wilsonian-than libertarian.tt 
Moreover, conservative libertarian texts, drawn from whatever 
point in time, seem to fit awkwardly into any tradition critical of the 
impact of wealth upon speech. As Graber concedes, the primary 
link between conservative libertarianism and his political libertari-
anism is that both seek to join, though in obviously different ways, 
speech and economic issues. Yet if one seeks historical antecedents 
for the approach Graber sketches, texts by the opponents of con-
servative jurisprudence-anarchists, women's rights crusaders, la-
bor organizers and agrarian populists, for instance-would seem 
more appropriate sources than those of Cooley, Burgess and 
company.12 
Second, and more broadly, Transforming Free Speech, with its 
focus on the "intellectual environment," simply cannot examine the 
larger cultural politics that helped to shape debates about legally 
protected speech. To take only a single example, the book ignores a 
monumental change that interacted with both the conservative and 
civil libertarian discourses about speech: the rise of mass commer-
cial culture. During the late nineteenth century, for instance, the 
legal writings of both Cooley and Brandeis were intertwined with 
changing modes of mass communication, especially those offered in 
celebrity-oriented joumalism.J3 And during the first decades of this 
century, the free-speech debates that most engaged so-called 
progressives addressed new forms of commercial expression, espe-
cially motion pictures, advertising, popular theater and muckraking 
joumalism.t4 
In this political-cultural context, Transforming Free Speech, 
which is implicitly shaped by the question "How can speech be 
given the broadest possible legal protection?," may give too little 
11. See, e.g., Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the 
American Historical Profession 112, 241 (Cambridge U. Press, 1988). 
12. See, e.g., David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of 
Law: A Progressive Critique 237 (Pantheon Books, rev. ed. 1990). Transforming Free Speech 
itself also discusses two important, often neglected figures who fit into neither the conserva-
tive libertarian nor the civil libertarian molds: Theodore Schroeder, a philosophical anarchist 
associated with Emma Goldman and with the Free Speech League; and Ernst Freund, the 
author of the classic treatise The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights (Calla-
ghan, 1904). Their writings, Graber notes, point to a "path not taken" by civil libertarians 
such as Chafee, but his important discussion of Schroeder and Freund remains limited within 
his overall, binary frame. See Transforming Free Speech at 54-65. 
13. See, e.g., Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which 
Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 562-63, 563-66 n.l (Lit-
tle, Brown, 5th ed. 1883); Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 
Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
14. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Levine, Highbrow/Lawbrow: The Emergence of Cultural 
Hierarchy in America (Harv. U. Press, 1988); J. Michael Sproule, Progressive Propaganda 
Critics and the Magic Bullet Myth, 6 Critical Studies in Mass. Comm. 225 (1989). 
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historical attention to another query, "Why is 'speech' deserving of 
special legal protection?" As mass commercial culture enveloped 
the very fabric of everyday life, variants of the "Why is speech spe-
cial?" question were asked repeatedly during the period in which 
conservative libertarianism allegedly gave way to civil libertarian-
ism.ts What emerged by the 1920s was not simply a new set oflegal 
doctrines, but much broader discourses about "free" speech which 
were rooted in complex economic, political, academic, as well as 
legal cultures.t6 
After 1900, discussions about the film making industry, again 
to note only one example, produced fierce debates about what kind 
of legal protection Hollywood's products deserved. During these 
discussions, people from legal and other professional (and nonpro-
fessional) communities consistently linked speech and economic is-
sues; equally important, their overlapping discourses helped to 
construct the complex relationship between "law," including 
Hollywood's own Production Code, and cinematic expression in the 
United States.17 Indeed, Hollywood itself came to offer powerful 
cinematic representations, including ones highlighting the economic 
dimensions of speech controversies, that intersected with other cul-
tural discourses about protected expression.ts 
Although Transforming Free Speech offers a very suggestive 
and valuable analysis of elite legal thought, its narrowly conceived 
intellectual approach tends to limit its view of an important period 
in the history of debates about legally protected expression. Histo-
ries of the First Amendment, especially those that seek to transform 
understandings about protected expression, might well look to a 
wider variety of cultural discourses in order to untangle the com-
plex chains of signification that have helped to give meaning to one 
of the most powerful of all phrases in the twentieth-century lexicon, 
"freedom of speech." 
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